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Summary ;
This paper explores the influence which the number of competitors
exerts on an individual's bidding behavior in sealed-bid auction
markets. The principal conclusion is that a greater number of competi-
tors may Induce either more-aggressive or less-aggressive bidding
behavior, depending on the nature of the uncertainties attending the
auction. However, the non-aggressive response appears most likely to
arise under conditions which characterize many of the auction markets
active in the U.S. economy. This contrasts sharply with the tradi-
tional view that the entrance of additional competitors to a market
is likely to enhance the level of competition which prevails.
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THE C(»1PETITIVE PRICING RESPONSE IN SEALED-BID AUCTION MARKETS
James L. Smith
A notion that is central to the study of industrial structure and
market performance is that the entrance of additional competitors to a
market is likely to enhance the level of competition which prevails.
This impact is likely to be reflected in various aspects of the industry's
conduct, but perhaps most prominently in its pricing behavior. The re-
lationship between number of competitors and prices is usually thought
to be an inverse one, with the additional competitors expected to engender
more aggressive pricing behavior on the part of all participants.
The present paper considers a possible exception to this paradigm:
that is, a case in which a greater number of competitors is expected to
induce less aggressive behavior. The case arises in the area of competitive
bidding, and is closely related to the particular allocative mechanism
embodied in sealed-bid auction markets. Although the nonaggressive in-
fluence of large numbers is not a universal consequence of sealed-bid
auctioning, as we will show, it appears most likely to arise under con-
ditions which characterize many of the auction markets active in the
U.S. economy. Therefore, an understanding of the competitive pricing
response in such auction markets is of both theoretical and practical
interest.
Price Tenders in Auction Markets
Regardless of one's particular view of pricing behavior in conven-
tional (non-auction) markets, there is general agreement that an increasing
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number of competitors will lead to lower prices. For example, the
simplest Cournot model of an undifferentiated industry composed of n fina^
yields an equilibrium price which is a decreasing function of n, with con-
2
vergence at the competitive level. Although the scope of competitive
reactions widens when we consider a differentiated industry (for example,
competitive variations in product quality), the basic result regarding
pricing behavior is sustained. The reader is referred to Shubik's [1970]
formulation of the differentiated oligopoly problem treated as a non-
cooperative game. The traditional relation between competition and price
may be derived alternatively from models of cooperative behavior among the
firms which compose an industry. Feilner's [1949] treatment of limited
joint maximization induced by recognized mutual interdependence among com-
petitors provides a useful framework for exploring the relation between
small numbers and cooperative success. Phillips [1962, p. 29] put the
basic principle quite succinctly: "As the number (of competitors) increases
... the probability that mutual understandings and implicit agreements
will be effective in restraining rivalry decreases."
There appears, a priori, to be no cause for the traditional competitive
pricing effect to fail in the context of auction markets. That is, we may
reasonably expect that a bidder's response to increased competition would
The principal exception to this rule occurs if there are substantial
scale economies in production, such that sny increase in number of firms
serving a market of fixed size implies a decrease in the unit scale of
operations, thus raising costs, and perhaps prices also. See Silberston
[1970, p. 519-20].
2
See Friedman [1977, p. 30].
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be to raise his own bid, in order to "stay with the pack" and remain
competitive. Indeed, a large body of empirical evidence supports
this view; for example, recent studies of bidding behavior for offshore
petroleum leases by Brown [1969], Lohrenz and Oden [1973], and Smith {197/1
find strong evidence of an aggressive competitive response. Unfortunately,
these findings, however appealing on intuitive grounds, conflict with
simulation results of the bidding problem which suggest that in many cases
the bidder's best course of action is to lower his bid in the face of
increased competition (see Capen, Clapp, and Campbell [1971]; and Dougherl:
and Nozaki [1975]).
The present paper explores the theoretical basis for these conflicting
results, with a view toward possible reconciliation; and attempts to clariiy
the influence which competition exerts in auction markets generally. It
turns out that additional competitors may induce either more or less aggres-
sive behavior on the part of auction participants, depending oa the circusi.-
stances at hand. The crucial factor, as will be seen, is the presence of
joint uncertainty: uncertainty regarding the value of the item being
auctioned (referred to as "commercial risk") compounded by the risk of
losing the auction to one's competitors (referred to as "competitive risk").
Throughout this paper we consider a "seller's auction," in which the
seller offers a single item of value to the highest bidder, in exchange
for the amount of the stated bid. In this context, an aggressive price
response consists of raising one's bid, so the traditional view of com-
petitive pricing behavior would imply a direct relationship between the
number of competitors and the amount of the tendered bid. The results
apply symmetrically to the ca?e of a "buyer's auction," wherein a ser-
vice contract is to be let by sealed bidding.
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Competitive and commercial risks are clearly Interdependent. The firm,
by Increasing the amount of its bid, increases the likelihood of winning
the auction, but at the same time increases the probability of paying
more than the item is worth. As we will see, the particular form which
this interdependence assumes weighs heavily in the bidder's forraulation
of a competitive pricing response.
To investigate the competitive effect operating in auction markets,
we formulate the individual bidder's problem in general terms. An item
is to be offered by sealed auction to a group of n competing bidders.
Our bidder is to select a bid amount (B) which maximizes the expected
utility of his terminal (post-auction) wealth. The bidder's utility
function u(.), is assumed continuous, with positive but decreasing
marginal utility.
The value (v) of the item at auction and the amount of the highest
competing bid (x) follow a blvarlate probability distribution, with joint
density given by f(v,x|n). This density is conditioned by "n" to reflect
the Influence which number of competitors exerts on the distribution of
highest competing bid. Because the amounts of competing bids depend on
our competitors' perceptions of the item's value, the random variables
"v" and "x" will not in general be independent. For example, it is prob-
able that if the amount of the highest competing bid were revealed to
our bidder before the auction took place, his ex ante appraisal of the
item's value would be revised to Incorporate this additional information.
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Consequently, we cannot In general decompose the joint density into the
product of marginal densities:
fCv,x|n) ?f g(v).h(x|n)
The bidder's terminal utility is a function of initial wealth (w)
,
and whether or not he wins the auction:
if B > X, terminal utility = u(w+v-B),
2
if B < X, terminal utility = u(w).
The objective function may then be written as:
00 B 00
max: E[u(B)] = /[/u(w+v-B)«f (v,x!n)dx + /u(w) 'f (v,x|n)dx] dv.
B B
If an optimal bid (B*) exists, it must satisfy the first-order condition:
93-i[u(B)] =• /[u(w+v-B*) - u(w)]'g(v|B*)«h(B*|n)dv
B*
00 B*
- /u'(w+v-B*)'/g(vis)«h(x|n)dx dv = 0;
The significance of interdependence between one's own value estimate
and the prospects for outbidding each of n competitors was first em-
phasized by Brown [1969]. Capen, Clapp, and Campbell [1971] also fo-
cused on this aspect of bidding behavior in the offshore oil leasing
market. The subject remains a point of confusion, however, and has
inspired a recent controversy among bidding theorists oriented towards
applications in the construction industry. See, for example, Gates
[1967], Rosenshine [1972], Benjamin [1972], NSykii [1973], Dixie
[1974], and Fuerst [1976]. Fuerst summarizes the main issues involved
in that debate with the most clarity.
2
Since the competing bid distribution is assumed continuous through-
out, the probability of a tie is zero and we need not specify a tie-
breaker rule. We also abstract from possible costs of preparing and
submitting a bid; hence, the bidder's wealth is only affected if the
auction is won.
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. . . which, after simplification gives:
B*
(1) h(B*|n)'E[Aulx='B*] = /h(x|n) 'Elu' (w+v-B*) |x]dx;
^
"^
. . . where Au = [u(w-f-v-B*) - u(w)].
Equation (1) characterizes the optimal bid as a function of the bidder's
initial wealth and the number of competing bidders. In principle the
equation may be used to determine the impact on B* of changes in the number
of anticipated competitors—what we call the "competitive pricing response."
As we will see shortly, the nature of the competitive response depends
crucially on the significance and bidder's perception of commercial versus
competitive risks.
Competitive Pricing Response; Comparative Statics
To demonstrate the influence of commercial and competitive risks
on the competitive pricing response, we divide the analysis into three
cases which represent alternative risk configurations. Case 1 abstracts
entirely from commercial risk by assuming the value of the item at auction
is known by the bidder. Consequently, the only uncertainty is the
amount of the highest competitor's bid. In Case 2 the item's value and
the amount of the highest competing bid are both assumed unknown, but
with the restriction that the two are assumed to vary independently. This
is essentially a mis-information model, in which competing bidders are able
to infer nothing from the bids tendered by their competitors. While such
Alternatively, the bidder may be assumed to act on his "best estimate"
of the item's value, while disregarding the uncertainty inherent in that
estimate.
? o.rv
n't al
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a model may appear contrived, It actually corresponds to a conjectured
behavioral pattern attributed to the U.S. oil and gas industry by Capen,
Clapp, and Campbell [1971].
In both Cases 1 and 2, it is easy to show that, under reasonable
assumptions, the competitive pricing response is aggressive. That is,
an individual bidder is induced to increase the amount of his bid in
response to additional competition—as intuition would suggest.
Finally, Case 3 explores the implications of full interdependence
between commercial and competitive risks, under the added restriction
of linear utility. Although not particularly desirable in its own right,
the restriction to linear utility has a double virtue: (a) it is analyt-
ically tractable; and (b) this specification corresponds to that employed
in the simulation studies of bidding behavior which first suggested the
optimality of a non-aggressive pricing response.
Case 1
The marginal probability distribution of v is assumed to be degen-
erate, with probability 1.0 concentrated at some value v. Consequently,
the first-order condition for an optimum (Equation 1) reduces to:
(2) ^^H(B*
£l = u'(w-W-B*) .
^^ u(w+v-B*) - uCw)
Essentially, the conjecture is that oil and gas companies have per-
sistently mistaken their own best interests by overlooking the inter-
dependence between competitive and commercial risks in offshore leas-
ing, with the consequence that actual bid tenders have been unduly
generous and realized profit rates from offshore development unex-
pectedly meager.
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B*
. . . where H(B*|n) = / h(B|n)dB.
We write this equation symbolically as:
(3) *(B*,n) S ¥(6*).
. . . where *(B*,n) = h(B*|n)/H(B*|n);
3„d nB*) - "' (^-^-^^^
u(w4v-B*) - u(w)
Previous authors have noted the similarity of the function *CB*,n) to
the failure rate function of statistical reliability theory. Roughly
speaking, *(B*,n) measures the probability that a bid of amount B* will
lose the auction, given that a bid of B*+6 would have been successful.
The existence of an optimal B* (satisfying Equation 2) within the
open interval (0,v) is ensured by rather weak conditions on the form of
the utility function and competing bid distribution. It is sufficient to
assume the utility function to be a continuous, strictly increasing function
of wealth; and the probability of winning the auction to be a continuous,
strictly increasing function of bid amount (B) throughout the interval
[0,v], with zero probability of winning associated with a zero bid:
H(0) - 0.^
A direct implication of this result is the phenomenon of underbidding:
B* < V. The degree of underbidding, denoted by v - B*, measures the
amount of surplus value the bidder reserves for himself, conditional on
See Hanson and Menezes [1968, pp. 526-27], and Attanasi [197A, p. 1425].
2
An existence proof, adapted from Hanson and Menezes' treatment of a
buyer's auction, is provided in Smith [1977, pp. 29-30],
~>3Vls
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winning the auction. The optimal degree of underbidding varies with the
degree of anticipated competition (n), according to Equation 3. We will
explore this relationship subsequently.
Uniqueness of the optimal bid is ensured by a pair of somewhat
stronger assumptions: (a) the utility function is twice differentiable
and strictly convex; and (b) the competing bid distribution function
—
H(B|n)—is differentiable in B throughout its range, with H'(B|n) = h(B|n);
and the ratio h(Bln)/H(B|n) = $(B,n) is non-increasing in B throughout
1
Its range.
To Investigate the nature of the competitive pricing response, we
evaluate dB*/dn, which (using Equation 3) may be written as:
*
(4) dB*/dn » "
*B B
By the assumptions on the utility function and competing bid distribution
we must have $„ < 0, and ^- > 0. Consequently, dB*/dn takes the sign
of * . In the Appendix it is proved that $ > under the conditions
of Case 1, Hence, the competitive pricing response must be aggressive in
The proof, also adapted from the work of Hanson and Menezes, is
provided in Smith [1977, pp. 31-33]. The assumption regarding the
behavior of $(B,n) is not transparent and probably merits further
comment. Hanson and Menezes [p. 527] argue in support of the assump-
tion on intuitive grounds. Formally, we note that for unimodal bid
distributions, *(B,n) must be strictly decreasing in the range above
the mode. Below the mode we require that the proportionate increase
in density not exceed the proportionate increase in cumulative prob-
ability. This will be true of bid distributions that are fairly uni-
form in the low range. It may also be true of distributions that are
not so uniform; for example, both the normal distribution and the
lognormal obey the property throughout the relevant range. In light
of the repeated comparisons of observed bid distributions to the
lognormal, the assumed behavior of $(B,n) appears reasonable.
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auction markets characterized by the absence of commercial risk. That
is, a bidder who knows the true value of the item being auctioned (or acts
on his best estimate of value while disregarding the uncertainty attending
that estimate) will raise his bid in response to increased competition.
Case 2
Commercial risk is now introduced, but with the important restriction
that the realized value (v) of the item at auction is statistically Inde-
pendent of the amount of the highest competing bid (x)—or so our bidder
believes. Under this restriction, the joint density of v and x may be
written:
f(v,x(n) = g(v)«h(xln).
The characterization of the optimal bid (Equation 1) then simplifies to
the following:
(5) h(B*|n)'E[Au] H / h(x|n) -Efu' (w+v-B*) ]dx.
^
^
Equivalently:
h(B*
H(B*
Hi = E[u'(w+v-B*)]
n) ~E[u(w+^-B*) - u(w)]
Redefining the function "i'(B*), this equation may be rewritten as;
(6) *(B*,n) = H'(B*),
. . . where: T(B*) = E[u'(w+v-B*)]
E[u(w+v-B*)-u(w)] '
and: *(B*,n) - h(B*ln)/H(B*In) ; as before.
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The competitive pricing response in Case 2 is now computed from Equation 6:
clB*/dn
B B
Since the function §(B*,n) is of the same form as in Case 1, its deriva-
tives retain the previous signs: <5 > 0; $ < 0. Because u'(.) and
[Au] are both increasing functions of B for arbitrary but fixed v, so
also must be YCB). Hence T^ > 0, and dB*/dn > 0. The competitive
response is again an aggressive one, as in Case 1. The simple presence
of commercial risk regarding the value of the item at auction does not
confound the earlier result.
Case 3
We now examine the bidder's behavior under the roost general (and
realistic) specification of commercial and competitive risks. We use
Equation 1 directly to characterize the optimal bid, but with the re-
striction to a linear utility function. Without further loss of gener-
ality, we assume:
u(w) = w;
u'(w) = 1, for all w.
Equation 1 may then be rewritten in the form:
In) 1(7) ^^
n) " E[v-B*|n,x=B*] *H(B*
Simplifying further, we may write the optimizing condition as;
(8) histnl = _J: .
^ -' H(B* n) ~ v - B* *
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. . . where v = E[vjn,x=B*].
Intuitively, v is the bidder's posterior expectation of the item's value,
conditional on the highest competing bidder having placed a bid in the
amount x = B*. In other words, v is a revised point estimate of the item's
value, incorporating the conjecture that non of the n-1 competitors is
prepared to bid higher than hirnself.
The characterization of the optimal bid given by Equation 8 raises a
topic which has been referred to as the "winner's curse" [Gapen, Clapp, and
Campbell, p. 645]. In the context of an auction with commercial risk, there
is a possibility that the bidder who tenders the highest bid is led to do so
because he overestimates the item's true value. This aspect of the auction
outcome leads to the i?npres.ai,on that in order to win an auction, you must be
willing to outbid a competitor who himself overvalues the item in question.
A more suggestive way of stating the problem is to say that it is "better" to
win an auction with few competitors than one with many, since the prospect of
outbidding many competitors is associated with a tendency toward reckless
optimism.
The firm's optimal behavior is modified accordingly, as can be seen
from Equation 8. Since the term h(B |n)/H(B|n) is necessarily positive,
we see immediately that B* < v. This is a revised statement of the
underbidding hypothesis, but with a new twist motivated by the firm's
desire to avoid the winner's curse. The bidder still underbids the
prospective value of the item, but not using his simple ex ante appraisal
as in Cases 1 and 2. Rather, the bidder selects a bid that will undercut
his ex post appraisal, even on the rather speculative assumption that no
one else is willing to bid as much.
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A further consequence is that an individual bidder might respond to
an increased number of competitors by reducing the amount of his bid.
Such a response would diminish his chance of winning in exactly those
situations that constitute poor bets.
The bidder's response to increased competition is determined in our
model by Equation 8, which yields:
dB*/dn = — ~
k"dv/dn + $
k-(l-d\f/dB*) -
^g^
. . . where, k = [l/(v-B*)J^ > 0;
and, *(B,n) = h(B |n)/H(B |n) , as before.
As in Cases 1 and 2, we have * > 0, and $„ < 0. The term
n B
(1 - dv/dB*) measures the responsiveness of the bidder's ex post valuation
to the amount of the hypothesized winning bid. Presumably the posterior
mean (v) increases less than linearly with the winning bid, so this term
is assumed to be positive."^ The sign of dB*/dn then hinges on the sign
and magnitude of d^J-/dn— the response of the posterior mean to an increasing
number of competitors, holding the amount of the winning bid constant.
Intuition suggests that this relationship is a negative one; a winning bid
of amount B from a group of n competitors is a more pessimistic statement
about the item's true value than if the bid were drawn from only n-1
However, if the bidder lacks confidence in his own prior appraisal,
he might put increasing emphasis on the information provided by his
competitors. In this case we might have dv/dB* > 1. This possible
sign reversal does not change the basic result—which is to demonstrate
an anbiguity regarding the sign of dB*/dn.
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competitors, etc. Thus we can reasonably expect dv/dn < 0. If the magnitude
of this effect is sufficiently great, the sign of dB*/dn will sv/itch from
positive to negative, and the possibility of a non-aggressive competitive
response becomes real. The bidding simulation models, which have generated
primarily non-aggressive competitive pricing strategies, demonstrate the
rather wide range of conditions under which this outcome obtains in practice.
Summary
We have demonstrated the conditions under which an individual bidder
would adopt a non-aggressive competitive pricing response. The conditions
involve the interaction of commercial and competitive risks, and therefore
presuppose uncertainty regarding both the magnitude of the highest competing
bid and the value of the item being auctioned. These conditions appear
to characterize many auctions in actual practice, and simulation studies
of bidding behavior for offshore oil leases suggest that the non-aggressive
response is perhaps the only viable bidding strategy in that market.
This result can be established rigorously by in\'oking a theorem from
the theory of order statistics. Briefly, the theorem states that if
6 is any parameter of the probability distribution function G(*J6),
such that dG/d6 < throughout; and if x represents the maximum value
obtained in an independent and identically distributed sample of size
n drawn from G('|e); then the posterior expectation of 6, conditional
upon observing x, must be a decreasing function of n, the sample size.
See Smith [1978].
If we interpret B as the true underlying value of an item at auction,
and G(«je) as the distribution function of each competitor's bid; then
we may apply the theorem on the assumption that a greater underlying
value ;iK>uld increase the probability of larger bids— i.e., dG/d6 < —
which seems quite reasonable.
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Does this body of evidence conflict with the traditional view of
large numbers of firms as a means for stimulating competition and pro-
moting economic efficiency? We can outline at least two reasons why
this is not the case.
Thus far we have described the competitive response as "aggressive"
if the bidder raises his bid, thereby sacrificing some part of his desired
surplus value (v-B). In Case 3, we must be more careful in our use of
the term "aggressive." If the bidder were to sustain his bid (B*) in the
face of increasing competition, he would likely perceive the ex post
valuation (,^}) to be shrinking, and his prospective share of surplus
value (-(^-B*) also diminishing. The same would be true, a fortiori,
if the bidder were to raise his bid. Accordingly, the bidder may reduce
his bid to recoup a part of this lost value, and yet take an aggressive
stand in the sense of having sacrificed some part of the value previously
accruing to him. Put quite simply, the private value of the auctioned
item may decrease as a result of greater competition, so it may be inap-
propriate to judge the aggressiveness of bidding strategy by focusing
on the behavior of bids in isolation.
!tore important regarding the efficacy of competition is the partial
equilibrium framework taken in the present paper. The analysis is not a
statment about the ultimate configuration of auction prices after a new
market equilibrium has been forged by the greater number of competitiors.
Rather, the study focuses on an individual bidder's response to attributes
of the market which can be taken as parameters for his decision problem.
The dynamic interaction among market participants is expected to influence
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these parameters and the resulting configuration of bid tenders as the
market proceeds to a new equilibrium. Therefore, the short-term com-
parative static response of a single bidder (i.e., the competitive pricing
response)—be it aggressive or not—is not a suitable description of the
impact of large numbers on market prices. The importance of an extension
from the behavior of individual bidders to the behavior of auction out-
comes is apparent.

The expression in Equation 3 is claimed to be positive. To prove this
we must evalute the component derivatives j using Equations 1 and 2:
H^ = ln(G)-[G3",
(4) Hg = n-g.[G]n-1 y
hn ^ g*[l+ln(G)]-[G]"'^.
Substituting from Equations 1 and 4 into 3, we have
^ (B n) =
g°[l+n-ln(G)]'[G]^''"^ - n-g»ln(G) [G]^""^
n
'- j^^2n
Thus;
$^(B,n) = |||^ > 0. for all B e [0,=o],
as was to be shown.
M/D/73

APPENDIX
Proof that 3> > 0.
n
For convenience we assume the n competitors to be indistinguishable,
such that the probability of each tendering a bid no greater than B is
denoted by G(B). The function G(.) is assigned continuous and differen-
tiable, with g(B) = dG(B)/dB. The bids of the n competitors then corres-
pond to n independent realizations from the density g(.).
The probability of the highest bid assuming a value no greater than
B is then given by:
(1) H(B|n) = [G(B)]";
with probability density
(2) h(B|n) = n.g(B)-[G<B)]"~^
The function of interest is
<b(n n1 .n h(S \2lHB,n) j^^g Ro '
with partial derivative
(3) *^(B,n) = —
. . . where H_ denotes -rrH(B|n), etc.
O QD
A similar proof applies to the case of distinguishable competitors;
i.e., where each bidder is characterized by a distinct bid distribution.
See Smith [1977, pp. 41-43].

REFERENCES
Benjamin, Neal B. H., "Competitive Bidding: The Probability of Winning,"
Journal of the Construction Division of the American Society of Civil
Engineers . 1972, 98(2) :313-30.
Brown, Keith C, Bidding for Offshore Oil; Toward an Optimal Strategy ,
Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1969.
Capen, E. C, Clapp, R. V., and Campbell, W. M. , "Competitive Bidding in
High Risk Situations," Journal of Petroleum Technology . June, 1971,
pp. 641-53.
Dixie, John M., "Bidding Models: The Final Resolution of a Controversy,"
Journal of the Construction Division of the American Society of Civil
Engineers . 1974, 100(C03) :265-71.
Dougherty, Elmer L., and Kozaki, M. , "Determining Optimum Bid Fraction,"
Journal of Petroleum Technology . March, 1975, pp. 349-56.
Fellner, William, Competition Among the Few . New York: Knopf, 1949.
Friedman, James W., Oligopoly and the Theory of Games . Amsterdam: North
Holland Publishing Co., 1977.
Fuerst, Michael, "Bidding Models: Truths and Comments," Journal of the
Construction Division of the American Society of Civil Engineers .
1976, 102(C01):169-77.
Gates, Marvin, "Bidding Strategies and Probabilities," Journal of the
Construction Division of the American Society of Civil Engineers .
1967, 93(C01):75-107.
Hanson, D. L., and Menezes, C. F,, "Risk Aversion and Bidding Theory,"
Papers in Quantitative Economics, Volume I , edited by J. P. Quirk
and A. M. Zarley. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press,
1968.
Lohrenz, John, and Oden, Hillary, "Bidding and Production Relationships
for Federal OCS Leases: Statistical Studies of Wildcat Leases,
Gulf of Mexico, 1962 and Prior Sales," paper presented at the
meeting of the Society of Petroleum Engineers of AIME, Las Vegas,
October, 1973.
NSykii, Pertti, "Discussion for 'Competitive Bidding: The Probability
of Winning' by Benjamin," Journal of the Construction Division of
the American Society of Civil Engineers . 1973, 99(1): 224-25.
Phillips, Almarin, Market Structure, Organization and Performaiice .
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962.

REFERENCES (continued)
Rosenshine, Matthew, "Bidding Models: Resolution of a Controversy,"
Journal of the Construction Division of the American Society of
Civil Engineers . 1972, 98(lTl 143-48.
Shubik, Martin, "Price Strategy Oligopoly: Limiting Behavior with
Product Differentiation," Western Economic Journal . 1970, 8(3):
226-32.
Silberston, Aubrey, "Price Behavior of Firms," Economic Journal . 1970,
80(319): 511-82.
Smith, James L. , "Bidding Behavior for Offshore Petroleum Leases,"
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University, 1977.
Smith, James L, , "Samples which are Pessimistic for a Class of
Distributional Parameters," unpublished paper, 1978.


1




